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FIRST AMENDMENT TRADITIONALISM 
MARC O. DEGIROLAMI 
ABSTRACT 
Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and cultural 
practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive meaning 
of the text. This Essay probes traditionalism’s conceptual and normative 
foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court’s traditionalist interpretation 
of the First Amendment to understand the distinctive justifications for 
traditionalism and the relationship between traditionalism and originalism. 
The first part of the Essay identifies and describes traditionalism in some of 
the Court’s Speech and Religion Clause jurisprudence, highlighting its 
salience in the Court’s recent Establishment Clause doctrine.  
Part II develops two justifications for traditionalism: “interpretive” and 
“democratic-populist.” The interpretive justification is that enduring 
practices presumptively inform the meaning of the words that they 
instantiate. Generally speaking, we do what we mean, and we mean what 
we do. The democratic-populist justification is that in a democracy, people 
who engage in practices consistently and over many years in the belief that 
those practices are constitutional have endowed those practices with 
political legitimacy. Courts owe the people’s enduring practices substantial 
deference as presumptively constitutional. The populist element in this 
justification is that traditionalism is a defensive interpretive method against 
what abstract principle in the hands of elite actors has wrought: 
intolerance, the corrosion of lived experience, and the distortion of text to 
mirror a particular class of contemporary moral and political views. 
In Part III, this Essay compares traditionalism with originalism, 
reaching two conclusions. First, traditionalism’s reliance on practices as 
presumptively constitutive of constitutional meaning is most distant from 
originalist theories that rely on abstract principle as constituting the 
meaning of text and that reject practice-based evidence as the equivalent of 
irrelevant “expected applications.” It is closest to varieties of originalism 
that read text concretely. Yet traditionalist judges are not engaged in 
making guesses about “expected applications,” but in making decisions 
about retrospective applications—drawing on old and enduring practices 
either to include within, or exclude from, a tradition the specific practice 
under review. Second, the Essay investigates the connection between so-
called “original law” theories of originalism and traditionalism. Original 
law theorists argue that originalism is “our law” as a sociological and 











cultural fact. But traditionalism may be more “our law” than originalism 
in some areas within the First Amendment and outside it. If the positivist 
defense of originalism truly counts as a justification for any theory of 
constitutional interpretation (an issue on which this Essay takes no 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and cultural 
practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive meaning 
of the text. In other work, I have described traditionalism, its influence 
across the domains of constitutional law, and possible explanations for and 
limitations of the method.1 Traditionalism is, in fact, pervasive across the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrine.  
This Essay probes traditionalism’s conceptual and normative 
foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court’s traditionalist interpretation 
of the First Amendment in order to understand the distinctive justifications 
for traditionalism in constitutional law and the similarities and differences 
between traditionalism and originalism. The first part of the Essay identifies 
and describes traditionalism in some of the Court’s Speech and Religion 
Clause jurisprudence. The Essay highlights traditionalism’s recent salience 
in Establishment Clause doctrine, where it is gradually but steadily 
becoming the Court’s preferred method in certain areas.  
In Part II, the Essay uses this doctrinal deposit to discuss two 
justifications for traditionalism: “interpretive” and “democratic-populist.” 
The interpretive justification is that while enduring practices may 
sometimes diverge from the meaning of text, they are a primary constituent 
of textual meaning. That is, enduring practices presumptively inform the 
meaning of the words that they instantiate. Generally speaking, we do what 
we mean, and we mean what we do. Indeed, we could not have a clear notion 
about what many words mean—and especially about how to interpret their 
meaning when it is unclear—without attending to the longstanding practices 
that illustrate their meaning. True, textual meanings and the practices 
 
1. See Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1123 (2020) [hereinafter DeGirolami, Traditions]. 











instantiating them are not the same thing. It is possible for there to be a 
mismatch between our practices and the meaning of the words we believe 
illustrate them. But the presumptive state of affairs is that the text and the 
practices instantiating it do match, in constitutional law no less than in other 
areas such as contract law, with its doctrine of “practical construction.”2 If 
lawmaking is a rational activity, there is a presumptive concordance 
between our laws and our actions and practices in relation to them—
between what we mean and what we do. 
The democratic-populist justification is that in a democracy, people who 
engage in practices consistently and over many years in the belief that they 
are constitutional have endowed those practices with political legitimacy. 
Practices that do not endure, or that have never existed, lack that type of 
democratic legitimacy. While courts may, on traditionalist premises, strike 
down longstanding practices as unconstitutional, they owe the people’s 
enduring practices substantial respect and deference as presumptively 
constitutionally legitimate. Enduring cultural and political practices reflect 
the people’s judgments about what is consistent with their fundamental law. 
The populist element in this justification is that traditionalism is a defensive 
interpretive method against what abstract principle, in the hands of elite 
actors, has wrought on the Constitution. Traditionalism is motivated, in part, 
by the fear of the intolerance, of the corrosion of lived experience, and of 
the distortion of text to mirror a particular class of contemporary moral and 
political views, that constitutional interpretation dependent on abstract 
principle can unleash. It is an interpretive method for those who cherish 
embedded political and cultural ways of doing and being. 
In Part III, this Essay compares traditionalism and originalism, reaching 
two conclusions. First, traditionalism’s reliance on practices as 
presumptively constitutive of constitutional meaning departs from some, 
but not all, varieties of originalism. It is most distant from originalist 
theories that rely on abstract principle as constituting the meaning of text 
and that reject practice-based evidence as the equivalent of irrelevant 
“expected applications.” It is closest to varieties of originalism that read text 
concretely. It differs from, but is compatible with, original meaning theories 
that take practices and “expected applications” to be “evidence” of meaning, 
or to be among the raw materials in the “construction zone.” But traditions 
and the enduring practices that constitute them are not the same as “expected 
applications,” though they are related to them. Traditionalist judges are 
engaged not in making guesses about “expected applications,” but in 
making decisions about “retrospective applications”— drawing on old and 
 












enduring practices either to include the specific practice under review as 
within the tradition, or to exclude it as outside the tradition.  
Second, the Essay investigates the connection between so-called 
“original law” theories of originalism and traditionalism. Original law 
theorists defend originalism from a positivist, rather than a normative or 
conceptual, point of view. They argue that originalism is “our law” as a 
sociological and cultural fact, as a matter of our extant legal practice. But 
this positivist defense of originalism actually also supports traditionalist 
interpretation, at least in part. Traditionalism may be more “our law” than 
originalism in some areas within the First Amendment and outside it. This 
Essay does not adopt the positivist justification as an independent defense 
of traditionalism, resting on its conceptual and normative defenses in Part 
II. Rather, it explores the structure of the new positivist justification for 
originalism, arguing that if it truly counts as a justification for any theory of 
constitutional interpretation, then it may support traditionalism as much as 
originalism. 
I. THE TRADITIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
No part of the Constitution has been interpreted traditionally by the 
Supreme Court as frequently as the First Amendment, and no part of the 
First Amendment more so than the Speech and Religion Clauses. In Speech 
Clause jurisprudence, traditionalism figures prominently in the doctrine of 
content-based exclusions from free speech protection,3 public forum 
doctrine,4 government speech,5 and other areas.6 As for the Religion 
Clauses, the Court has interpreted traditionally more frequently in its 
establishment cases than in its free exercise cases7—for example, when 
 
3. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 795–96 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010).  
4. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191, 196–97 (1992) (plurality opinion); id. at 214–15 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (describing places “which 
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate”). 
5. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210–12 (2015); 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
6. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (political 
pamphleteering); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–113 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353–57 (1976) (political patronage). 
7. There are some cases at least partially about the Free Exercise Clause that have adopted 
traditionalist methods, however. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182–85 (2012). 











considering state-sponsored religious displays,8 legislative prayer,9 tax 
exemptions,10 and more.  
This rapid doctrinal canvas already highlights the first crucial feature of 
traditionalist interpretation: a focus on political or cultural practices as 
constituents of textual meaning. Traditionalism is not focused on judicial 
precedents as constituents of meaning. It is not common law 
constitutionalism.11 As Justice Scalia once remarked, the common law “is 
not ‘customary law,’ or a reflection of the people’s practices, but is rather 
law developed by the judges.”12 Traditionalism, by contrast, does take 
concrete political and cultural practices to be ingredients of the meaning of 
the constitutional text or the text of a doctrinal rule. For example, the Court 
has held that it will not find new substantive categorical exceptions to free 
speech protection “without any long-settled tradition of subjecting that 
speech to regulation” and it has insisted on a careful and narrow description 
of the specific political practice at issue even when it considers expanding 
the doctrine of categorical exceptions.13 
Second, traditionalist interpretation also emphasizes the age and 
endurance of practices. Age and endurance are what makes a practice a 
tradition. A practice that is both old and enduring—one that people have 
engaged in consistently and in concentrated fashion before, during, and after 
the ratification of a particular textual provision—is presumed by the 
traditionalist interpreter to be consistent with the meaning of the 
constitutional text or rule that it instantiates. Where practices are less old, 
less continuous, or less dense (continuity and density being the two elements 
of endurance), they bear decreasing interpretive authority on traditionalist 
premises. Imagine a ski slope: it may be smooth with good snow for skiing 
from beginning to the end; or sparse, with interspersed snowy and bare 
sections. Sections of the slope that are smooth may be especially so—
densely packed with snow—or they may be coated only with a thin, icy 
layer. The longer (age) and more continuously smooth (endurance) the 
 
8. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2086–89 (2019); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671–86 (1984).  
9. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 786 (1983). For further discussion of American Legion and Town of Greece, see infra notes 16–29 
and accompanying text.  
10. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 684–85 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (drawing 
the historical lineage of the practice of tax exemption to the Jefferson administration and Madison’s 
tenure in the Virginia Assembly); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756, 792 (1973). 
11. Cf., e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996).  
12. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 4 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997). 












slope, the better for skiing.14 The slope becomes smoother because of the 
quantity and density of the snow lying beneath it.  
Third, and finally, the strong presumption in favor of even old and 
enduring practices may be overcome in two ways: either by directly 
conflicting text or by a very powerful moral principle that runs against the 
tradition.15 The presumption of constitutionality for enduring practices is 
strong, but defeasible, reflecting one feature of traditionalism’s dynamism. 
Thus, traditionalist interpretation takes (1) practices; (2) of long age and 
endurance; (3) to be powerfully presumptive constituents of textual 
meaning. 
Two relatively recent Establishment Clause cases involving the concrete 
practices of legislative prayer and state-sponsored religious displays are 
helpful in identifying traditionalism and exploring certain open questions 
about it. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court upheld the 
practice of legislative prayer given by members of local congregations in a 
small, upstate New York municipality.16 The Court concluded that 
legislative prayer existed continuously over three distinct periods: during 
the colonial period, at the ratification of the Bill of Rights, and afterward.17 
It emphasized the age and endurance of the practice, continuing in the 
federal and state governments, as a “majority of the other States” maintained 
the “same, consistent practice.”18 Legislative prayer, the Court said, is “part 
of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom.”19 Thus, the 
Court’s method in Town of Greece was quintessentially traditionalist: it took 
the age and endurance of a concrete practice as constitutive of the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause, at least presumptively.20 
The Court’s most recent Establishment Clause decision, American 
Legion v. American Humanist Association, also reflects traditionalist 
themes. The case concerned the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross 
that local residents in Prince George’s County, Maryland, had dedicated in 
1919 to honor the county’s fallen soldiers in World War I.21 In upholding 
the cross against an Establishment Clause challenge, a majority of the Court 
 
14. I set to the side the thrill-seeking skier who derives perverse pleasure from icy and rocky 
terrain.  
15. The preceding two paragraphs condense the explanation of traditionalism developed at 
greater length in DeGirolami, Traditions, supra note 1. 
16. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).  
17. Id. at 575–76. 
18. Id. at 576. 
19. Id. at 587. 
20. A legislative prayer practice that “denigrate[s] nonbelievers or religious minorities, 
threaten[s] damnation, or preach[es] conversion” either falls out of the tradition or, even if it falls within 
the tradition, might be held unconstitutional as running directly contrary to a powerful moral imperative. 
Id. at 583. 
21. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2076–78 (2019).  











held that “monuments, symbols, or practices that were first established long 
ago” can be imbued with multiple purposes and meanings.22 “The passage 
of time,” the Court said, “gives rise to a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.”23 The plurality opinion as well as Justice Gorsuch’s 
concurrence (which Justice Thomas joined) would have gone further, 
adopting an approach for state-sponsored religious displays that took a 
monument’s participation within a tradition long followed in American 
government as evidence of its constitutionality. Or, as Gorsuch put it, “a 
practice consistent with our nation’s traditions is just as permissible whether 
undertaken today or 94 years ago.”24 
American Legion is a fragmented and perplexing decision, in part 
because though a majority of the justices expressed some support for an 
Establishment Clause methodology that looks to history and tradition, they 
could not reach consensus either about the method’s details or its 
justifications. The plurality emphasized the age of the specific monument, 
symbol, or practice being reviewed.25 Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas 
would have combined an inquiry about coercion with history and tradition 
to conclude that state-sponsored religious monuments and symbols are not 
coercive and therefore constitutional.26 Justice Gorsuch argued that what 
matters is not a particular monument’s age, but whether the monument—
old or new—fits within a broader tradition of enduring practice.27  
Judging from Town of Greece and American Legion, the justices are 
haltingly but steadily moving toward a more fully articulated account of 
traditionalism, though they have taken some errant turns. The plurality 
acknowledges that a monument’s age correlates with its constitutionality, 
even describing a “presumption” of constitutionality for monuments, 
symbols, and practices of sufficient antiquity (capturing the traditionalist 
elements of age and presumptive constitutionality).28 But it focuses on 
objects rather than ongoing practices and it does not account for endurance 
in addition to age. Justice Gorsuch rightly focuses on practices rather than 
the objects that happen to be in front of the Court, and his is therefore the 
richer account of traditionalism, but he omits the features of endurance and 
presumptive but defeasible constitutionality that are necessary for a more 
completely developed account.29 Though the justices are beginning to piece 
 
22. Id. at 2082. 
23. Id. at 2085. 
24. Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (describing a new “history and tradition” approach adopted by the Court). 
25. Id. at 2087–89 (plurality opinion).  
26. Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 2096–97 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
27. Id. at 2102–03 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
28. Id. at 2082 (plurality opinion). 












together a traditionalist methodology, they have not articulated any 
explanations or justifications for traditionalism. 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRADITIONALISM 
This section devises two justifications for traditionalism—one 
conceptual and one normative—which it calls “interpretive” and 
“democratic-populist.” These justifications are not exhaustive. There may 
be other reasons to adopt traditionalist interpretation. They are also 
independent of one another. Traditionalist interpreters may embrace both or 
only one of them. But they reflect two prominent and distinctive 
explanations for adopting traditionalism in at least some circumstances. The 
first involves a conceptual claim about the nature of textual interpretation 
as a presumptively rational activity, while the second sets out a normative 
argument about the democratic authority of enduring practices in a 
constitutional republic.  
A. Interpretive: We Do What We Mean, and We Mean What We Do 
The interpretive justification for traditionalism is that enduring practices 
are constituents of textual meaning—whether constitutional text or the text 
of a doctrinal rule. That is, practices are one of the crucial (though not the 
only) ingredients of meaning. There certainly may be occasions where, for 
various reasons that can include mistake, oversight, or bad faith, our 
practices can deviate from the meaning of the words that they are thought 
to instantiate. In the main, however, we do what we mean, and we mean 
what we do. Generally speaking, our practices inform the meaning of the 
words they illustrate and concretize. In the case of clear text, recourse to 
practices is often unnecessary, though even here it may be probative of 
meaning. But interpreting unclear text requires a knowledge of the 
constituents, or ingredients,30 of its meaning.31  
Consider the following faintly absurd illustration. Suppose a parent 
announces the rule, “You must have good manners at the dinner table,” to a 
young child. There are some words in the rule—“dinner” or “table,” for 
example—that are clear enough that they probably will need no 
 
30. See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: 
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 223 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).  
31. As explained further below, the argument that practices are constituents of meaning is distinct 
from the claim that “expected applications” are constituents of meaning. Practices are patterns of 
concrete actions and behaviors, while “expected applications,” as one theorist has put it, are meanings 
that are “intended or expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text.” Jack M. Balkin, 
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295 (2007). Nevertheless, there are 
connections between certain types of intentionalist originalism and traditionalism that are discussed in 
Part III. 











interpretation. Even so, a knowledge of past practice might be helpful to the 
child in understanding their meaning: “dinner” is only clear because it refers 
and has always referred to the practice of eating a meal in the evening hours. 
If “dinner” were associated with a different practice, it would mean 
something else.32 But the meaning of the phrase “good manners” is unclear 
and presents a starker interpretive problem. The parent could try to clarify 
by recurring to another abstraction—for example, telling the child that 
“good manners” is the same thing as “polite,” “proper,” or “respectful” 
behavior. Yet these explanations would only push back the interpretive 
problem by one step, introducing other unclear phrases requiring their own 
interpretation.  
The interpretive justification for traditionalism is that the interpretation 
of unclear words requires recourse to past practices, because practices are 
constituents of meaning. The child can effectively interpret the meaning of 
“good manners” because she knows (or is quickly apprised) that some 
practices—eating with her hands, putting her feet on the table, shoveling 
unwanted food on the floor for the dog to eat—have been established as 
“bad manners,” while others—wiping her face with a napkin rather than her 
sleeve, using utensils, chewing with her mouth closed—have been 
established as “good manners.” The practices before and after the rule is 
announced, instantiating good and bad manners, concretize and reinforce 
the meaning of the rule. And the longer and more consistently the practices 
of “good manners” have been reinforced (before, during, and after the rule’s 
announcement), the more authority they will come to possess as correct 
instantiations of the rule.33 
True, the rule is not synonymous with the practices constituting it. The 
parent might forget on occasion to apply the rule or overlook it for some 
reason, and in consequence the child might engage in a practice she believes 
to be “good manners,” perhaps over a long period, only to find out later that 
the practice actually is not “good manners.” True also, an enduring practice 
is not conclusively constitutive of the meaning of the text it is thought to 
illustrate. Babbling incessantly might be “good manners” when the child is 
very young but might cease to be “good manners” as the child develops and 
other behavioral codes supervene. But enduring practices are at least 
presumptively reliable guides for the meaning of the words they instantiate.  
One can go further. Practices are the primary constituents of textual 
meaning, the principal ways in which we come to know what text means. 
 
32. There may be some cultures in which “dinner” refers to the midday meal, for example. 
33. This account bears some resemblance to the description of practices in ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 191–203 (1981), but it differs inasmuch as 
it relies on practices to inform the meaning of the words they instantiate, while for MacIntyre, pursuing 












Indeed, consider the alternative: a world in which our practices ordinarily 
conflict with the words we think they illustrate would be irrational in the 
extreme as well as generally unbearable. The child either would have no 
idea at all what the meaning of the rule might be in practice or might even 
adopt some sort of perverse meta-rule that “good manners” must mean, as 
a general matter, behaving as badly as possible while eating. We cannot 
have a clear idea about the meaning of words without attending to the 
practices that illustrate them, because in the ordinary course, what we mean 
and what we do are mutually reinforcing.34 To interpret words requires 
recurring to the practices that concretize their meaning in the world. The 
recurrence to practices is ineluctable, even in cases where the interpreter 
rejects or replaces an old and enduring pattern of practice—that is, a 
tradition—with another. Traditions instruct, and what is learned from them 
over long periods of time either confirms or modifies what we believe is the 
meaning of the words they illustrate. 
This justification for traditionalism is reflected in some of what the 
Supreme Court has said about interpretation in its First Amendment 
doctrine. For example, in Burson v. Freeman, the plurality opinion upheld 
state restrictions on vote solicitation and the distribution of campaign 
material within one hundred feet of the polling place.35 Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion, which was necessary to the judgment, explained just 
what was “traditional” about the “traditional public forum”:  
 If the category of “traditional public forum” is to be a tool of 
analysis . . . it must remain faithful to its name and derive its content 
from tradition. Because restrictions on speech around polling places 
on election day are as venerable a part of the American tradition as 
the secret ballot, [the law] does not restrict speech in a traditional 
public forum . . . .36 
The ancient and enduring tradition of government restrictions on speech in 
polling places, and streets and sidewalks adjacent to them, rendered these 
locations nonpublic forums. Statutes restricting such speech had been in use 
“[e]ver since the widespread adoption of the secret ballot in the late 19th 
century” and “[b]y 1900, at least 34 of the 45 States . . . had enacted such 
restrictions.”37 
Scalia’s decisive concurrence in the judgment in Burson helpfully 
isolates the interpretive justification for traditionalism. The enduring 
 
34. See EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 198 (1981) (“One of the main reasons why what is given by 
the past is so widely accepted is that it permits life to move along lines set and anticipated from past 
experience . . . .”). 
35. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193–95 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
36. Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
37. Id. at 214–15. 











practices of state regulation around the polling place are constituents of the 
phrase “traditional public forum.” Identifying and tracing the legacy of such 
practices, Scalia argued, was a superior method for understanding the 
meaning of “traditional public forum” than recurring to the Court’s “time, 
place, and manner” test because the latter was simply a truncated abstraction 
of the traditions of government regulation of speech around the polling 
place:  
This unquestionable tradition could be accommodated, I suppose, by 
holding laws . . . to be covered by our doctrine of permissible “time, 
place, and manner” restrictions upon public forum speech—which 
doctrine is itself no more than a reflection of our traditions. [But that] 
. . . would require some expansion of (or a unique exception to) the 
“time, place, and manner” doctrine . . . . It is doctrinally less 
confusing to acknowledge that the environs of a polling place, on 
election day, are simply not a “traditional public forum” . . . .38 
Scalia’s point is that interpreting phrases whose meaning is unclear 
(“traditional public forum”) by recurring to other phrases whose meaning is 
unclear (“‘time, place, and manner’ restrictions”) is less useful than 
examining the history of the concrete practices of state regulation of speech 
around the polling place.39 Ancient and enduring practices—those that have 
been carried on for many years, continuously, and in concentrated fashion—
are constituents of the meaning of the “traditional public forum,” and 
consequently of the scope of this feature of the freedom of speech. 
Or consider the Court’s justification for its methodology in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway.40 The practice of legislative prayer endured in 
concentrated ways over the colonial period, the ratification of the 
Establishment Clause, and thereafter.41 The First Congress—the same 
Congress that approved the language of the Establishment Clause—
engaged in the practice and subsequent Congresses have ever since.42 And 
a “majority of the other States” also maintained the “same, consistent 
practice.”43 This enduring pattern of practice is “part of our heritage and 
tradition,” the Court said.44 Yet it did not clearly explain why “our heritage 
and tradition” represents a plausible way to interpret the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause. That is, what is it about “tradition” that informs 
textual meaning?  
 
38. Id. at 216 (citation omitted). 
39. Id. 
40. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
41. Id. at 572–73. 
42. Id. at 572. 
43. Id. at 576. 












The closest the Court came to a justification was this comment:  
[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the 
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice 
is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice 
that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical 
scrutiny of time and political change.45  
In other words, an abstract test defining the Establishment Clause was “not 
necessary” because the Court had a more elemental interpretive unit ready 
to hand: a practice of the age and endurance of legislative prayer. And 
practices of similar age and endurance are likewise presumptively 
constitutive of textual meaning—one of the primary building blocks that 
generate the meaning of an unclear phrase that remains authoritative in the 
absence of some powerful countervailing factor.46 
Other legal disciplines incorporate the same interpretive insight. 
Contract law, for example, recognizes the doctrine of “practical 
construction,” which holds that courts may recur to the parties’ course of 
conduct or ongoing pattern of behavior under the terms of an agreement to 
interpret its meaning.47 A “course of performance accepted . . . is given great 
weight in the interpretation of the agreement.”48 In some cases, courts have 
held that such “practical construction” can even alter the meaning of a 
contract that the court would have given it as an original matter and without 
such an enduring pattern of practice.49 But the basic point is that other areas 
of the law affirm the role of enduring practices in constituting textual 
meaning.50 Of course, there are salient differences between the 
interpretation of laws—constitutional or statutory—and contracts, one of 
which is the prominent role of intentionalism in the latter.51 Yet if anything, 
the role and importance of enduring practices is greater for interpreting 
 
45. Id. at 577. 
46. In Town of Greece, as explained earlier, evidence that the legislative prayer was engaged in 
to “denigrate” or “proselytize” might have overcome the presumption in favor of the tradition. Id. at 
583. Even in that case, however, the rejection of the practice before the Court would have taken the 
existing traditional deposit as its interpretive point of departure. 
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4)–(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
48. Id. § 202(4).  
49. See City of New York v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 86 N.E. 565, 567 (N.Y. 1908) (“When the parties 
to a contract of doubtful meaning . . . enforce it for a long time by a consistent and uniform course of 
conduct, so as to give it a practical meaning, the courts will treat it as having that meaning, even if as an 
original proposition they might have given it a different one.”). 
50. See, e.g., White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179, 184 (Pa. 1813) (“A construction thus 
commenced and thus continued is entitled to the highest respect. The imperfection of language causes 
much uncertainty in writings which have been drawn up with the greatest deliberation.”). 
51. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? The Failure 
of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1181–88 (1998) (explaining 
some of the differences between contracts and statutes for interpretive purposes).  











constitutions and statutes than for contracts.52 Enduring practices stabilize 
meaning over time and they also provide notice to third parties about the 
meaning of the law, both of which are far less necessary in contract 
interpretation than in constitutional law. 
To be sure, many questions remain: How narrowly or broadly can a court 
draw any given practice to construct a tradition? What criteria does it use to 
exclude new practices as not conforming to the tradition, or to include new 
practices as more broadly within “the tradition” long followed?53 How old 
and enduring must a practice be to qualify as a constituent of meaning, and 
at what point does its interpretive power wane or give out? And perhaps 
most vexingly: When is the presumptively constitutive quality of traditions, 
strong as it is, defeated by other factors—clear text to the contrary, for 
example, or an overriding moral principle? Even in the comparatively 
unusual circumstances wherein a tradition is defeated, the strength and 
endurance of the tradition will itself inform judgments about whether to 
retain it. These complications aside, cases like Burson and Town of Greece 
illustrate and adopt the interpretive justification for traditionalism: that 
when a practice is old and enduring, it is presumptively a constituent of the 
meaning of the text that it instantiates.  
B. Democratic-Populist: The People’s Enduring Decisions 
The second justification for traditionalism combines democratic and 
populist elements. By contrast with the descriptive, conceptual nature of the 
interpretive justification for traditionalism, the democratic-populist 
justification carries a normative charge. It involves a set of claims about the 
legitimacy and authority of democratic decisions by non-elite actors with 
constitutional dimensions, and what is required for the Court to contravene 
them. 
In a democracy, traditions often represent the people’s decisions about 
what accords with their foundational charter of governance. Longstanding 
practices, particularly when they are government practices, reflect choices 
supported by democratic approval, acceptance, or at the very least political 
inertia sufficient to fix them in place. The older and more enduring the 
tradition—the more continuous and the more frequently it is reiterated and 
re-entrenched—the greater democratic authority it enjoys. Even on 
traditionalist premises, arguments to defeat such traditions or to strike them 
 
52. There are analogues in other disciplines. For example, the law of treaties treats “[a]ny 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation” as constitutive of the meaning of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. 
53. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2102 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 












down as unconstitutional are admissible, but the democratic authority of 
enduring traditions is a presumptive reason to reject such claims.  
When the Supreme Court, whose democratic accountability is far less 
direct than that of its co-equal branches and state and local governments, 
affirms a tradition, it also affirms a set of enduring democratic decisions and 
judgments. When the Court upsets a tradition, it is often acting anti-
democratically. So, for example, Professor Michael McConnell has argued 
that the Court’s reliance on the people’s “settled judgments” about what 
does and does not comport with the Constitution allows the Court to “keep 
faith with the democratic postulates of our system” while also exercising an 
anti-majoritarian function where government bodies veer wildly from 
traditional practices.54 To repudiate “settled judgments” with democratic 
authority breaks that faith and denies that authority; it therefore requires an 
especially compelling justification for doing so. Similarly, Professor 
Thomas Merrill once justified what he termed “conventionalism” in 
constitutional interpretation—which focuses in part on “the evolved 
practice of different branches of governments” and the “practice of private 
citizens”—on the basis that it constrained the anti-democratic element in 
judicial review and promoted popular sovereignty.55 
Justices on the Court sometimes have had this justification for 
traditionalism in mind, as when Justice Scalia defends traditionalism 
because it “intrudes much less upon the democratic process” than its 
competitors.56 So, too, has the Court in several of its First Amendment 
decisions justified traditionalism by invoking the “judgment [of] the 
American people” about the scope of free speech protection in the absence 
of an enduring tradition of government regulation,57 or holding that the First 
Amendment is not ordinarily triggered by longstanding practices of 
government speech because “it is the democratic electoral process that first 
and foremost provides a check on government speech.”58 
Several Establishment Clause decisions further crystallize the 
democratic feature of this justification for traditionalism as well. In Lynch 
v. Donnelly, for example, the Court explained its decision to uphold a 
municipality’s longstanding practice of exhibiting a religious display during 
 
54. Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. 
REV. 665, 685. 
55. Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 511–12, 522 (1996). 
Merrill’s conventionalism is distinct from traditionalism because the former emphasizes the interpretive 
force of current or contemporary practices. 
56. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia 
discusses both originalism and traditionalism in his McDonald concurrence, but his remarks about 
democratic legitimacy concern the force of post-enactment practices and patterns of regulation.  
57. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2015)). 
58. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015). 











the Christmas season on the ground that “[t]he city, like the Congresses and 
Presidents . . . has principally taken note of a significant historical religious 
event long celebrated in the Western World.”59 The enduring decisions 
about religious displays acknowledging the Christmas holiday “by the 
people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 
centuries” imbued the practice in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, with powerful 
democratic authority that the Court was unwilling to disturb.60 Likewise, in 
American Legion, the majority spoke about the “historical importance” that 
an old monument—in this case a World War I-era cross—acquired with the 
passage of time, “remind[ing] the people of Bladensburg and surrounding 
areas of the deeds of their predecessors and of the sacrifices they made in a 
war fought in the name of democracy.”61 To strike down the monument as 
a violation of the Constitution, the majority suggests, would be tantamount 
to striking a blow against what had become an enduring symbol of 
democratic self-government as well as the county’s democratic decision to 
maintain the monument. It would also dishonor the memory of those who 
had died to defend the American democratic ideal. 
Yet the Court’s respectful appreciation in American Legion for “the 
community that erected the monument nearly a century ago and has 
maintained it ever since,” for the decisions of the “relatives, friends, and 
neighbors of the fallen soldiers,” and for the communal meaning that the 
cross had acquired over time and that had united the residents of the county 
in “grief and patriotism,” all suggest something more than a simple 
presumption in favor of democratic choices.62 That something more is an 
element of populism, one that appears in many other traditionalist decisions 
and is often fused with the democratic justification. 
When the Court interprets traditionally, it relies on old and enduring 
practices at least in part because of its apprehensions about what 
constitutional interpretation in the hands of elite actors, perhaps including 
itself, has done to constitutional law. It looks to concrete practices, rather 
than abstract principles, because interpretation grounded in abstract 
principle has frequently tended to uproot and displace certain enduring ways 
of life, and to substitute and entrench a particular set of elite cultural and 
political preferences. The populist element of traditionalism is a response or 
reaction to certain perceived disfunctions in the dominant governing 
consensus. And when the Court interprets traditionally, it is participating in 
that response. It is concerned with preserving and maintaining various non-
elite ways of doing and being in the world against interpretive approaches—
 
59. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). 
60. Id. at 686. 
61. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019). 












generally grounded in abstract ideals or principles—that would damage or 
even destroy them.  
Several scholars have observed that judges are highly responsive to and 
often influenced by elite values and opinions. Professors Neal Devins and 
Lawrence Baum, for example, have argued that Supreme Court justices are 
“elites who seek to win favor with other elites”—that is, the intellectual and 
cultural class that formed the justices’ habits, dispositions, and sensibilities 
and with whom they continue to interact both professionally and 
personally.63 The Court is often predisposed toward, and prepared to 
channel, a set of principles and views that represent a very particular stratum 
of cultural and political opinion that comprehends public intellectuals, law 
professors and other academics, the upper reaches of the legal profession, 
prominent journalists, powerful political networks, and the like. Judges’ 
cultural perspectives, particularly on social questions, are often shaped by 
the academic institutions that conferred their degrees. Technological 
advances and “virtual briefing” practices, as Professors Jeffrey L. Fisher 
and Allison Orr Larsen have explained, have amplified the federal courts’ 
access to elite opinion as well as their tendencies to favor it,64 but the general 
phenomenon is not uniquely contemporary. 
When judges strike down particular traditions as unconstitutional—
whether the traditions are political, religious, cultural, social, or some 
combination of these—they are wont to do so on the basis that a principle 
of overriding importance requires that result. Equality, liberty, dignity, 
neutrality, rationality—these are only some of the most frequently invoked 
abstract principles that have been used by the Supreme Court, in some of 
the most culturally fraught constitutional contests of the last century, to 
strike down a set of enduring practices as violating the nation’s fundamental 
law. Yet why, one might ask, should a tradition that cannot be justified on 
thoughtful, rational, and principled grounds ever survive?  
The traditionalist response to this challenge, reflecting a populist 
justification, is that “thoughtful” interpretation in constitutional law has 
generally meant interpretation that favors and entrenches the values, 
principles, and predilections of the educational and cultural elites in 
American society. “[T]he thoughtful part of the Nation,” as a plurality of 
the Court once put it in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, is the part that 
embraces “applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not 
been seen by the Court before.”65 It is the part of the nation, as the Court 
 
63. NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS 
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT, at xi (2019). 
64. Jeffrey L. Fisher & Allison Orr Larsen, Virtual Briefing at the Supreme Court, 105 CORNELL 
L. REV. 85 (2019). 
65. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality opinion). 











said in Obergefell v. Hodges, that influences the Court to perceive “new 
insights” about the Constitution derived from “legal principles” that include 
“new dimensions of freedom” and “unjustified inequality within our most 
fundamental institutions.”66 “All the world is ‘concepts,’” as Yuval Levin, 
quoting Casey, described this perspective,67 and the application by the Court 
of these new principles and concepts often serves precisely to displace and 
dismantle traditional practices and replace them with elite cultural 
preferences. It is as if the business of constitutional judging involved little 
more than a conversation between judges, elite lawyers, and law professors, 
and the Court had no need to give reasons for its decisions that are seen as 
credible by those that do not share the underlying commitments of elite 
actors. 
The populist element of the democratic-populist justification suggests 
that traditionalism is generally a constitutional approach more suited to the 
non-elites of American society—those whose longstanding practices, and 
the cultural, communal, and political commitments they instantiate, may not 
conform to the ongoing “thoughtful,” principle-driven re-imagination of the 
Constitution to reflect and impose elite opinion as a national mandate. As 
Professor Harold Berman once put it in discussing the historical school 
associated with the nineteenth-century German jurist Friedrich Karl von 
Savigny, the law should be closely connected with “the ideas and norms 
reflected in a people’s historically developing traditions, including its legal 
tradition.”68 Judges may well appreciate this justification for traditionalism 
even if they might not necessarily affirm these traditions for themselves in 
their own lives.  
Once again, some of the Court’s First Amendment cases are useful in 
pinpointing this justification. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court 
upheld a small, lower-middle-class municipality’s69 enduring practice of 
offering a prayer “intended to place town board members in a solemn and 
deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, and 
follow a tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state legislatures” 
against the claim that it violated the Establishment Clause’s abstract 
 
66. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596, 2603, 2606 (2015). 
67. Yuval Levin, Taking the Long Way: Disciplines of the Soul Are the Basis of a Liberal Society, 
FIRST THINGS MAG. (Oct. 2014), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/10/taking-the-long-way [http 
://perma.cc/XY9J-7AL2]. 
68. Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 16 (2005). For 
further reflections on the German historical school and its several insights for the American law of 
religious liberty today, see MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, Part II: Tragedy and History, in THE TRAGEDY OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55 (2013). 
69. The Town of Greece’s population is just over 95,000 people whose median household 














principle of religious neutrality.70 As Justice Alito put it in his Town of 
Greece concurrence, the Town’s “informal, imprecise way” of selecting 
guest chaplains is “typical of the way in which many things are done in 
small and medium-sized units of local government,” and when these towns 
seek “in good faith to emulate the congressional practice” of legislative 
prayer, the Court should not disrupt those practices simply because they do 
not conform to the justices’ own preferences and values.71 To impose those 
preferences would render “local government . . . a religion-free zone,” and 
in consequence destroy the enduring “historic practice,” which was, in fact, 
what the Second Circuit had suggested would be its own preferred outcome 
when it struck down the practice.72 
Traditionalist justices sometimes say that they are interested in what they 
claim to be distinctively American popular traditions as embodied in old 
and enduring American practices, but what they sometimes seem to mean 
is the practices of non-elite Americans. As the Court emphasized in 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a government speech case arising in 
another small, blue-collar town73 that concerns the expressive function of 
physical monuments for local governments, traditionalist interpretation 
protects “American” traditions, stretching back to the founding and before, 
that reflect the “history” and “local culture” of particular communities—not 
the broad and uniform principles of elites, either here or abroad, that would 
destroy such traditions.74 Likewise, Justice Scalia stressed the “long usage 
of our people” in his decisive Burson concurrence as of particular 
importance for traditionalism, but what he seems to have intended is that 
traditionalism preserves the enduring practices of American localities and 
small governments in managing their electoral processes for the protection 
of democratic republican ideals.75 
It should be emphasized that like traditionalism’s interpretive 
justification, the democratic-populist justification is presumptive only, not 
conclusive. A tradition that flatly contradicts constitutional text will not 
survive, no matter how much it may reflect enduring democratic or populist 
choices. Likewise, there are times where a tradition violates a moral or 
political principle of great power that defeats it—and rightly so. In these 
situations, its democratic and populist bona fides fail as a defense against its 
 
70. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014). 
71. Id. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring). 
72. Id.  
73. See QuickFacts: Pleasant Grove City, Utah, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
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74. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).  
75. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis 
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constitutionality. To give perhaps the best-known and most notorious 
example in all of constitutional law, the practice of segregating railroad cars 
on the basis of race was once defended by the Court as one of the 
“established usages, customs, and traditions of the people,” even though the 
actual age and endurance of the practice of segregation by race in railroad 
cars was, in fact, actually relatively recent at the time.76 Yet the moral 
principle of racial equality, as an interpretation of the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause, together with other sociological and psychological 
considerations, were sufficiently compelling to reject that ostensible 
tradition.77 The Court has made analogous points in First Amendment 
contexts, and even on traditionalist premises, there are ways to vindicate a 
variety of interpretive and political interests that may run counter to old and 
enduring practices.78 Nevertheless, for traditionalists, these situations are 
not the presumptive state of affairs. Rather, traditionalism takes the age and 
endurance of practices to bear the hallmarks of presumptive democratic 
authority, and it accords such practices the respect that the people’s 
decisions ordinarily deserve in a democratic republic. 
III. COMPARING TRADITIONALISM AND ORIGINALISM 
This part compares traditionalism with originalism, once again relying 
on some of the First Amendment doctrine discussed earlier to sharpen 
certain points of contrast. The comparison is worth undertaking both 
because originalism is one of the dominant theories of constitutional 
interpretation today and because there are important similarities and 
differences between the methods. Both show some respect for (or at least 
do not show an open hostility toward) the authority and wisdom of the past, 
though for somewhat different reasons. Both rely on historical evidence for 
understanding the meaning of constitutional text, though each gives 
different weight to historical evidence before, during, and after ratification 
of the meaning of particular constitutional provisions, and each emphasizes 
different features of history.79  
This Essay cannot canvas the relationship between originalism and 
traditionalism comprehensively, so it instead focuses on two particularly 
salient issues: first, the ways in which theories of original meaning and 
original intention overlap and depart from traditionalism with respect to the 
interpretation of unclear text; second, the extent to which a recent positivist, 
 
76. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); cf. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445 (1873) (interpreting a federal statute preceding the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid racially segregated railway cars). 
77. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
78. For discussion, see DeGirolami, Traditions, supra note 1, at 1130, 1168–70. 












legalist development in the defense of originalism may support 
traditionalism.  
A. Traditions and Retrospective Applications 
Originalism is an umbrella category under which many varieties exist, 
some of which are closer to and some more distant from traditionalism.80 
Original public meaning theorists, as distinguished from intentionalist 
originalists, are all interested in the meaning of the constitutional text 
communicated to the public at the time of its enactment. But public meaning 
originalists disagree among themselves about how to derive the meaning of 
text when it is unclear81 (or about the “meaning of meaning” in such 
cases),82 and it is this issue that provides a first profitable point of contact 
and comparison with traditionalism.  
Some public meaning originalists derive meaning when interpreting 
unclear text by employing what they call “the method of text and 
principle,”83 in which the abstract “principles” that are “embodied” in the 
text are taken to be its meaning for purposes of new applications.84 Some 
originalists in this general methodological line read unclear text with a 
“presumption of liberty,”85 but other abstract values such as equality, 
nondiscrimination, neutrality, the principles espoused by various 
progressive (or, for that matter, conservative) “social movements,”86 and 
others would also fit within this variety of original meaning. Other original 
meaning theorists speak of a difference between interpretation and 
construction, the latter of which concerns the effect given to the meaning of 
words, a particularly vexing issue when that meaning is unclear.87 These 
theorists have described a “construction zone” which “becomes the focus of 
 
80. For discussion, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
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otherwise under-determinate. 
82. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2015). 
83. Balkin, supra note 31, at 295. 
84. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
427, 498, 502 (2007).  
85. See Steven G. Calabresi, On Originalism and Liberty, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 39 
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explicit attention when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or 
the implications of that meaning are contested.”88 Some take a 
comparatively ecumenical or at least noncommittal view of the “normative 
concerns” that might be used to derive meaning in such circumstances,89 
while others emphasize the “original function,” “spirit,” “point,” or 
“purpose” that the text was thought to serve.90 Still other public meaning 
originalists focus on “original methods,” the interpretive rules in place at 
the time of a particular provision’s ratification.91 These theorists reject 
exercises in constitutional construction in cases where the applicable rules 
or methods cannot settle an interpretive issue.92  
This is an extremely compressed account of only a limited number of 
some prominent accounts of original public meaning on one particular 
issue—the procedure for interpreting unclear constitutional text. But it is 
sufficient to identify one important point on which these theories intersect 
with traditionalism: their view of the effect of enduring legal practices on 
meaning. No original meaning theory gives primacy to ancient and enduring 
practices as constituents of meaning, so that none is synonymous with 
traditionalism on that point at least. Indeed, very few original meaning 
theories specifically discuss the interpretive force of old and enduring 
practices at all. Nevertheless, one can see these theories on a continuum 
from those that elevate particular abstract principles (such as freedom or 
equality) as the exclusive touchstones for constitutional interpretation of 
unclear provisions, to those that are more ecumenical or noncommittal 
about what falls into the “construction zone,” to those that reject principled 
or “spirited” interpretation when fixed interpretive rules or conventions run 
out. Original meaning theories that look to abstract principles to interpret 
unclear text are likely to admit and exclude very different applications than 
traditionalist interpretation, since “principled” interpreters will be guided 
not by enduring practices but by their sense of what allegiance to their 
favored principles—or to the ones that they purport to locate in the 
Constitution—demands. Original meaning theories that look to concrete 
rules or methods of interpretation extant at the period of a textual 
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provision’s ratification are likely to align more closely with concrete and 
enduring practices extending before, during, and after ratification.  
A related, unresolved issue between original meaning and original 
intentions theorists concerning the role of future, concrete applications of a 
constitutional provision may shed even more light. Some theorists who look 
to original intentions do so because they believe that the concrete intentions 
of the authors or ratifiers of constitutional text about its application 
constitute the meaning of that text.93 If the authors or ratifiers of a text 
affirmatively did not believe—or, indeed, would be horrified at the 
prospect—that it would apply to a specific issue, then it seems to these 
theorists perverse and objectionable from a democratic perspective for a 
court today to authorize that application.94 Original meaning theorists have 
taken a variety of positions on the interpretive force of so-called “original 
expected applications.”95 Advocates of the “method of text and principle” 
reject expected applications outright, since what matters for them is whether 
the abstract principle said to embody the text may be extended by modern 
courts to encompass new applications, whether or not envisioned, endorsed, 
or repudiated by the authors and ratifiers.96 Other original meaning theorists 
say that they “do not recommend relying entirely” on expected applications, 
because the authors or ratifiers may have been mistaken even if they had 
conceived a particular application.97 But a substantial number take the view 
that expected applications may be “evidence” or “probative” of textual 
meaning, though always inconclusive evidence.98 For example, Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that it is, in the main, highly improbable that 
meaning and expected application will diverge, and that such expectations 
will “often be . . . the best evidence of what that meaning is.”99 Professor 
Solum writes in a similar and helpfully precise vein: 
If the meaning of a given string of constitutional text (or clause C1) 
is ambiguous and could have two senses (S1 and S2), and 
constitutional actors at a time, T2, that is proximate to framing and 
ratification of C1, acted in a way that provides evidence that they 
believed the meaning was S1 and not S2, then those actions are 
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evidence that the meaning was in fact S1. On the other hand, if T2 is 
not proximate in time to the framing of ratification of C1, then its 
evidentiary value is diminished. And even early historical practice 
provides evidence that must be evaluated and weighed against other 
evidence: early historical practice might reflect mistaken beliefs 
about original meaning or a deliberate circumvention of the true 
meaning for various reasons.100 
Expected applications are not the same thing as the enduring practices 
that constitute the meaning of text on traditionalist premises. Expected 
applications are concrete intentions about the future application of text to 
some specific issue or question, while enduring practices are ancient, 
continuous, and concentrated actions, customs, or patterns of conduct 
undertaken almost always, as I have argued,101 in the belief that they 
comport with the meaning of the words they instantiate, thereby becoming 
ingredients of that meaning and reinforcing it. Nevertheless, there is a 
connection between old and enduring practices and expected applications. 
Old and enduring practices give the traditionalist interpreter presumptive 
confidence that a particular application is, or is not, warranted; an 
application squarely within the tradition is constitutional; one squarely 
outside the tradition is not. But enduring practices also allow the 
traditionalist interpreter to extrapolate the meaning of text going forward—
that is, when the issue before a court involves a similar, but not identical, 
practice whose fit within the tradition is uncertain. Elsewhere, I have 
described an analogous traditionalist technique as the “narrowing” or 
“broadening” of a tradition either to exclude or include the particular 
practice under review as within the tradition.102  
For example, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kagan argued in 
dissent that the tradition of legislative prayer recognized by Marsh v. 
Chambers and extending back to the founding did not encompass a small-
town meeting attended by members of the public as petitioners,103 while 
Justice Kennedy and, later, other judges, argued for broadening 
constructions of the tradition of legislative prayer that encompassed the 
practice used by the Town.104 Likewise, Justice Brennan once argued that 
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the tradition of state-sponsored religious symbols, if any exists, should be 
drawn narrowly, and that it must include evidence of the specific practice 
before the Court from the time of textual ratification: “at the time of the 
adoption of . . . the Bill of Rights, there was no settled pattern of celebrating 
Christmas, either as a purely religious holiday or as a public event.”105 Other 
justices in these and other First Amendment controversies have opted for 
broader characterizations to encompass the practices the Court was 
examining as within the applicable tradition.106 
The technique of broadening and narrowing a tradition is not so much an 
exercise in divining the expected applications of the founders or ratifiers of 
a textual provision, so much as one in retrospective application—taking an 
existing tradition that clearly is, or is not, an illustration of constitutional 
text and discerning whether it encompasses a practice that does not fit within 
the focal or central examples of the tradition but nevertheless may lie within 
it.107 Professor Solum comes closest in the paragraph above108 to clarifying 
one originalist response to the interpretive relevance of past practices along 
these lines: while he acknowledges the evidentiary value of past practices 
for textual meaning where the practices are “proximate to framing and 
ratification,” there are two salient differences with traditionalism.109  
First, Solum only grants past practices “evidentiary” force as compared 
with the constitutive force they have for traditionalists. As a practical 
matter, this may not make a significant difference, but it does matter 
conceptually. Original meaning theorists do not recur to practices as the 
primary interpretive unit. They instead prefer to talk about “meaning” 
without giving practices any interpretive lexical priority or presumptive 
weight. Not all original meaning theorists rely on practices as “evidence” of 
meaning, but even those that do will not start and generally end with 
practices. Practices are simply one component of a basketful of original 
meaning “evidence” that are not given any presumptive interpretive 
authority. Second, for Solum, proximity to framing and ratification is the 
key factor in measuring the interpretive force of past practices,110 while age 
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and endurance before, during, and after framing and ratification (or, 
metaphorically, a long and smooth ski slope throughout) are paramount for 
traditionalists.111 
Traditionalism is therefore closest to those originalist theories that read 
the text concretely—as tethered closely to those ancient and enduring 
practices that were and are thought to instantiate the meaning of unclear 
text—even as it differs from even those originalist theories as to the 
evidentiary power of traditions for the meaning of the Constitution. As was 
seen in Part II.B, traditionalism’s emphasis on enduring practices is justified 
by democratic-populist reasons and the constraining features of such 
reasons on the scope of judicial discretion. Here, too, the connection with 
originalism is complex. While early accounts of originalism—including 
public meaning originalism—emphasized the beneficently constraining 
quality of originalism on judges,112 these justifications have been 
complicated, if not altogether dismissed, in more recent originalist 
defenses.113 Many originalists today are not motivated to adopt originalism 
for its capacity to protect and promote democratic governance. On this 
point, as well as on the more general suggestion that “methodologies don’t 
constrain . . . constitutions constrain,”114 there may be significant differences 
between traditionalism and originalism, since judicial constraint in the 
service of democratic-populist ends is an important reason to adopt 
traditionalism in the first place. 
B. Is Traditionalism Our Law (of the First Amendment)? 
In his insightful division between “positivist,” “natural law,” and 
“historical” schools of jurisprudence, the legal historian Harold Berman 
once characterized originalism as positivist in orientation—as deriving its 
authority from “a body of rules laid down . . . and enforced by the supreme 
lawmaking authority”115—while historical approaches focus on the “legal 
history[] of the nation” and its transmission in practices over time as an 
ongoing “tradition.”116 Though Berman may have been right to suggest 
some fundamental perspectival differences among the schools, there are 
nevertheless historical elements, and even natural law varieties, of 
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originalism,117 as well as positivist elements of traditionalism, so that each 
may partake of the overarching jurisprudential disposition of the other to 
some extent. 
The positivist elements of both originalism and traditionalism represent 
another fruitful point of comparison between them. Over a series of papers, 
Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs have defended public 
meaning originalism on a positivist, rather than a normative or conceptual, 
basis. Baude, for example, has claimed that originalism is “our law”—that 
“our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to inclusive 
originalism”118 or that the “social facts” of our existing interpretive practices 
support originalism, or at least originalism understood in a broad and 
“inclusive” fashion.119 Originalism is “our official story,” Baude and Sachs 
argue, as a day-to-day matter about what our constitutional law actually is 
and what our legal practice reflects.120 Baude defends the claim that 
originalism is “our law” against objections that in fact there are many non-
originalist features of constitutional interpretation and adjudication 
(precedent that does not conform to original meaning, for example) by 
adopting an “inclusive” account of originalism: original meaning is the 
“ultimate criterion” but it may “incorporate” or “permit” other interpretive 
or adjudicative techniques consistent with itself.121 Nevertheless, “the most 
serious challenge to our view,” Baude and Sachs write, “ought to be an 
empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our 
law.”122 
Traditionalism offers Baude and Sachs this sort of empirical, practice-
based challenge, and it draws evidentiary power in part from First 
Amendment doctrine and what the Supreme Court says and does (or says 
that it is doing). In certain doctrinal areas, and particularly in certain pockets 
of First Amendment law, what the Supreme Court says that it is doing—the 
“official story of our law” that it tells, applies, and transmits 
intergenerationally123—when it interprets the meaning and limits of the 
Speech and Religion Clauses is traditionalist, not originalist. As discussed 
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in Part I and at greater length elsewhere,124 the Court’s doctrine in the areas 
of content-based exclusions from free speech protection, public forum 
doctrine, government speech, legislative prayer, state-sponsored religious 
displays, tax exemptions, and others is traditionalist, not originalist. And the 
First Amendment is not the only area where the Court’s constitutional 
methodology is and has long been traditionalist.125 Frequently, the Court is 
explicit that it is looking to “tradition” or “our heritage” or taking account 
of “American practices” to resolve disputes in these areas.126  
Conversely, the Court has only very rarely, if ever, adverted to 
originalism as its default methodology in these substantive areas. More 
importantly, apart from what the Court says, it does not engage in the sort 
of originalist analysis that it uses in other cases where it has expressly 
adopted (and, often enough, expressly named) originalism.127 In many ways, 
the positivist defense of originalism mounted by Baude and Sachs is a much 
more natural conceptual fit for traditionalism: the interpretive “social 
practices”128 the justices use are, perhaps not surprisingly, to investigate the 
age and endurance of other social and political practices in determining the 
Constitution’s meaning. It’s social practices all around. But that point aside, 
on the empirical question of what “our official story” is when it comes to 
constitutional interpretation: (1) what the justices do; (2) what the justices 
say they are doing; and (3) what the justices do not say they are doing—all 
three of these pieces of empirical data often point much more directly 
toward traditionalism than originalism. Not always, of course, but at least 
as often as they indicate that “our story” and our fundamental criteria for 
interpretive authority are originalist. The only additional bit of evidence a 
traditionalist might desire would be an explicit declaration in no uncertain 
terms by the Court that it is not adopting originalism in these cases. 
Professors Baude and Sachs might respond to this traditionalist challenge 
in a few ways. They might say that their inclusive originalism is capacious 
enough to encompass or incorporate traditionalism. That is, the Hartian rule 
of recognition129—the ultimate rule specifying what counts as law at all, or 
the “rule that determines which rules are binding”130—remains originalism, 
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and traditionalism is simply one technique among others that the Court 
sometimes uses that is consistent with originalism. Thus, for example, 
Professor Baude’s study of the “liquidation” of textual meaning over time, 
which is similar in some, but not all, respects to traditionalism, may fit 
within a larger positivist originalist architecture.131 The “first layer of legal 
citations”132 that may actually appear in the Court’s opinions does not really 
matter so much as the underlying and often unstated theoretical assumptions 
and commitments. Baude and Sachs might also suggest that one way to test 
whether originalism encompasses and incorporates traditionalism is to 
imagine a case where they conflict—where a tradition has arisen and 
endured that was not consistent with the best view of the meaning of a 
textual provision at the founding. Baude and Sachs might contend that in 
such unusual cases, the original public meaning defeats the tradition, as 
even traditionalists appear to admit in conceding that the presumption in 
favor of a tradition may be overcome by directly contrary text. Finally, 
Baude and Sachs might say that though traditionalism reflects the Court’s 
actual doctrinal practice in some areas, and even its self-consciously 
adopted methodology, constitutional doctrine reflects only one piece of 
sociological evidence about what “our law” actually is; other evidence, such 
as the justices’ expressed views in other public contexts—Justice Kagan’s 
comment that “we are all originalists,”133 for example, or Justice Alito’s 
comment that he is “a practical originalist”134—is more strongly supportive 
of originalism than traditionalism. 
These points can be answered, however. First, while the idea of an 
“inclusive originalism” that can “incorporate” other non-originalist methods 
and techniques is coherent, as originalism becomes increasingly inclusive, 
the concrete evidence for originalism as the rule of recognition becomes 
increasingly thin. Indeed, perhaps it eventually becomes so thin that its 
coherence begins to dissolve as one starts to wonder exactly what sort of 
evidence of legal practices Baude and Sachs have in mind and just how it 
constitutes “better evidence” about what is “our law” than what the Court 
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says and does in its constitutional doctrine. At the very least, it becomes 
harder to test the thesis as it becomes more theoretical and impractical.  
The point is not so much about whether the Court invokes originalism as 
a veneer or pretense for some other actual practice that it uses to resolve 
cases, as Professor Mikolaj Barczentewicz has argued in criticizing the 
Baude and Sachs view.135 Nor is it that there are other plausible candidates 
for what “our law” is from an external point of view—the point of view of 
legal sociologists or legal theorists attempting to describe what the Supreme 
Court does rather than what it thinks it is doing.136 Rather, it is that both as 
a matter of the “official story” and as a matter of the “practical” or “actual 
story”—both from the internal point of view of the relevant legal actors137 
and from the external, factual, point of view—the Court often invokes 
traditionalism, and not originalism, to explain its interpretive approach. The 
Court’s higher-order justification (or “what we tell ourselves, not just what 
we do on the ground”)138 as well as what the Court actually does “on the 
ground” frequently point squarely in traditionalism’s direction. Thus, the 
advantage of taking traditionalism, rather than originalism, to be “our law” 
in such cases is that it places the argument about what “our law” is within 
the core of our constitutional system’s actual, self-reflective doctrine and 
practice, rather than in the realm of a theory about what “our law” might be 
that becomes harder to falsify just exactly in proportion to its increasing 
inclusivity. 
Second, however, Baude and Sachs may have a stronger response in 
proposing a thought experiment about what would happen in a case of direct 
conflict between the original meaning of text and an old and enduring 
tradition thought to instantiate that text. If traditionalists themselves 
concede that traditions and the text that they constitute could conflict, and 
that in such cases of conflict, the presumption in favor of the tradition may 
be defeated, then isn’t originalism really “our law”? While the point is 
powerful, its strength diminishes once one sees its practical and empirical 
limits. For reasons I have discussed earlier in justifying traditionalism 
conceptually and interpretively—that is, that in the main, what we do and 
what we mean coalesce—situations of direct and clear conflict between the 
meaning of the constitutional text and the traditions instantiating it are 
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extremely infrequent.139 What is far more frequent is that the Court recurs 
to traditions once it finds some quantum of under-determinacy or lack of 
clarity in the meaning of the text. And the more willing the Court is to 
identify a lack of clarity, the more readily it will rely on traditions as 
constitutive of textual meaning.140  
For example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, which concerned the meaning 
of the Recess Appointments Clause, Justice Scalia argued in his 
concurrence in the judgment that traditionalist interpretation is unavailing 
in the face of plain meaning directly to the contrary, for “[p]ast practice does 
not, by itself, create power.”141 And yet in practice, the Noel Canning 
majority’s willingness to use its considerable discretion to find textual 
ambiguity permitted it to move seamlessly to the old and enduring traditions 
that ultimately disposed of the case.142 What is “our law” in Noel Canning: 
the surface-level statement that clear text prevails, or the actual resolution 
of the case using traditionalist methods? If anything, as discussed earlier, 
certain First Amendment cases demonstrate that the absence of evidence of 
the specific practice being reviewed in the founding generation is 
insufficient to defeat a tradition, provided the practice before the court may 
be characterized, using a process of retrospective application, as broadly 
within the tradition.143 Cases like Lynch v. Donnelley and Town of Greece 
v. Galloway144 therefore suggest that a tradition can survive even when it 
does not have strong original meaning support. Lack of evidence of original 
meaning is not the same thing as a direct conflict with original meaning, of 
course, but it remains to be seen what the Court would do if it actually did 
ever confront a case where original meaning and traditionalist meaning 
directly conflicted. Until it does, and we obtain some evidence for what the 
social facts of adjudication are in such cases, the question of originalism or 
traditionalism’s interpretive mastery over the other is unknown. 
What is known, however, is that the “official story” told by Professors 
Baude and Sachs, one that “trace[s] developments from the Founding” and 
that they say “isn’t very controversial”145 as an account of “our law,” does 
not fully capture the methodology the Court uses when it interprets 
traditionally. The Court certainly includes founding-era evidence but its 
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most traditionalist decisions often explore and rely on colonial and pre-
colonial historical precedents. Similarly, the Court often depends at least as 
heavily on post-ratification developments as on founding-era history when 
it traces the lineage and endurance of a tradition of practice. One might even 
say that to the extent the Court has adopted originalism in these cases, it is 
precisely because founding-era evidence of historical practice is only one 
piece, albeit a powerful piece, of reliable evidence within the Court’s larger 
traditionalist frame. 
Finally, with respect to other sources of evidence for “our official story” 
beyond constitutional doctrine, traditionalists can point to similar dicta or 
extra-judicial statements, including by some of the judges Baude and Sachs 
mention, that seem to support traditionalism at least as much as originalism 
as the rule of recognition. Justice Kagan recently said in her American 
Legion concurrence that “I too ‘look[] to history for guidance,’” though she 
declined to issue a broader statement about the role of history and tradition 
in Establishment Clause doctrine.146 Justice Kavanaugh embraced a “history 
and tradition test” in his American Legion concurrence,147 and he has 
expressly supported the role of traditionalism in constitutional interpretation 
elsewhere.148 Neither of these justices spoke about originalism in their 
remarks. Justice Gorsuch has likewise frequently supported traditionalism 
in constitutional interpretation and elsewhere,149 and, as Professor 
Christopher Green puts it, “it is clear that he would interpret much of the 
Constitution in light of tradition.”150 These justices are not alone; indeed, 
this list does not include Justice Scalia, arguably the most traditionalist 
justice ever to sit on the Court, and there are many others that could have 
been included.151 If extra-doctrinal sources count as evidence for the “our 
law” claim, then one certainly can find plenty of statements at least as 
supportive of traditionalism as originalism. And yet, doctrinal statements 
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and methods ought to carry special force as evidence of the law of the 
Constitution. If what we are interested in is “our official story” of 
constitutional law, what the Court does, says, says that it is doing, and does 
not say that it is doing, should all count as powerful empirical data 
supporting a positivist theory of our law. 
This Essay does not claim that the positivist defense of originalism 
provides a third justification for traditionalism supplementing the 
interpretive and normative justifications discussed in Part II. To do that, it 
would have to embrace the “our law” claim as a true justification for any 
interpretive theory, but there are powerful reasons to doubt that it is. 
Professors Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin Walsh, for example, have posed 
important questions about why anybody should adhere to the originalist rule 
of recognition identified by Professors Baude and Sachs, as well as just 
whose internal point of view matters in locating that rule.152 This Essay 
takes no position on those important, highly theoretical questions, and it 
prescinds from any overly ambitious claims about traditionalism as actually 
being “our law” to the exclusion of anything else, since the evidence merely 
points to its being “our law” some of the time (though, it must be said, in 
increasing degrees). The point is instead to test Baude and Sachs’s 
“descriptive doctrinal sociology”153 and to show a positivist point of contact 
between originalism and traditionalism. If one were inclined to find the 
positivist account of originalism persuasive, then one should find it at least 
as, if not more, persuasive for traditionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has long used traditionalism to resolve controversies 
across the domains of constitutional law. This Essay has identified and 
described traditionalist constitutional interpretation in the Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine, justified it on interpretive and democratic-populist 
grounds, and reached two conclusions about traditionalism’s relationship to 
originalism. Many questions remain about traditionalism in constitutional 
interpretation, including why it seems to be more powerful as the Court’s 
preferred method in some textual and doctrinal pockets than in others, how 
judges go about drawing traditions narrowly or broadly, and at what point 
the strong presumption in favor of a tradition begins to weaken or give out 
altogether. Yet it seems probable that traditionalism’s influence will 
strengthen in the coming years, particularly in the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. If it does, then the Court will have to (1) iron out various 
internal differences among the justices about the method; and (2) grapple 
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with traditionalism’s fundamental justifications and its relationship to 
originalism. This Essay represents some small, but steady, steps toward 
these ends. 
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